We present a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) 
Data
A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract between two counterparties that essentially provides insurance against the default of an underlying entity. In a CDS, the protection buyer makes periodic payments to the protection seller until the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract, whichever is first. The premium paid by the buyer is denoted as an annualized spread in basis points and referred to as CDS spread.
If a credit event (default) occurs on the underlying financial instrument, the buyer is compensated for the loss incurred as a result of the credit event, i.e. the difference between the par value of the bond and its market value after default.
Our dataset uses credit default swaps on corporate bonds and comprises the evolution of the term structure of CDS spreads for five European countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. We collect daily time series from Markit at maturities of 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years from May 23, 2007 to September 17, 2012 We take non-sovereign entities from all sectors; the CDSs are written on senior unsecured debt and denominated in Euro. For each country and each maturity we average the individual CDS spreads. For comparison purposes, we also report the North American benchmark CDS index CDX.
NA.IG. For this index, for each maturity we average among the 125 entities that constitute the index. As the time period investigated spans both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European debt crisis, we split the full sample period into two subsamples for all our analyses. The first subsample (May 23, 2007 -December 31, 2009 
Figure 2. Term structure of CDS spreads for the United Kingdom
Credit Spreads and Equity Volatility during Periods of Financial Turmoil 
Figure 4. Term structure of CDS spreads for Spain
The first subsample (May 2007 -December 2009) displays significantly higher CDS spreads and elevated volatility for most countries due to the GFC. Moreover, the term structure is almost flat and at times even inverted, mainly because the very short-term end of the curve increased significantly during that period. This stands in stark contrast to the second subsample (January 2010 -September 2012).
The steeper slope of the term structure is accompanied by lower CDS spread levels and drastically reduced volatility.
Spain and Italy are the exceptions where CDS spreads reach higher levels during the second subsample, which includes the European debt crisis. 
(T, K) and is the solution of the equation c bs (t, s t , K, T, σ bs , t (T, K)) = c(t, s t , K, T) ❶
As the Table 2 . Since the first eigensurface is always positive, it is associated with a translation or shift of the smile. As the first eigenvalue accounts for 75% of the global variance on average, we conclude that a one-factor model, based on this eigensurface, provides a reasonably good model for the dynamics of the smile. For a more accurate model we need to go beyond this first factor. The second eigensurface is, for all times to maturity, positive for moneyness lower than one and negative otherwise. A shock along this mode implies that out-of-the-money (OTM) put options, whose volatility is given by the smile with moneyness lower than one, will become more expensive. OTM call options, whose volatility is given by the smile with moneyness greater than one, will become less expensive. As a consequence, this eigensurface is associated with a bear market movement.
The corresponding eigenvalue represents 17% of the total variance on average. This factor affects the skew of the smile. Lastly, the third eigensurface is associated with a bull market movement. A shock along this eigensurface implies a decrease of long-term implied volatility for all times to maturity, a strong increase of short-term OTM call prices and a lesser increase of short-term OTM put prices.
Its eigenvalue is equal to around 5% of the total variance.
As the first three eigenvalues account for 97% of the total variance, it is not necessary to go beyond these three factors. We can now decompose the dynamics of the smile into these factors. We define the three scalar processes
We can now decompose the dynamics of the smile into these factors. We define the three scalar processes ❷ which are the projection of the implied volatility change on the eigensurfaces, hence each one quantifies to which extent the smile "moves" along the direction given by the corresponding factor. Therefore, ∆VOL 1,t is associated with a shift of the smile, ∆VOL 2,t with a change of the skew (slope) of the smile, and ∆VOL 3,t with a change of the convexity of the smile. The principal component analysis relates the functions used to the covariance structure of the process.
The factor decomposition allows us to reduce the dynamics of the smile, which is a surface, into three scalar time series that encompass most of the statistical properties.
Cross-Hedging Between Credit and Volatility Factors
In this section, we focus on a regression analysis of the first factor (i.e. the main factor). More precisely, we regress the first volatility factor on a set of explanatory variables chosen among the credit factors. Since we have three credit factors, we perform three regressions. Also, we reverse the analysis by regressing the first credit factor on a set of volatility factors. These regressions are of practical interest as they allow us to devise cross-hedging strategies. The regressions are 4.1. Credit-Volatility Disconnection During the GFC We first analyse the GFC period and report in Table 3 
Credit-Volatility Connection During the European Debt Crisis
We now focus on the second subsample and report in Figure   4 . Consequently, even when the CDS and volatility markets are volatile, they can still be connected. This aspect is crucial from a hedging point of view as underlined before.
From these results we can also ascertain the impact of lower volatility factors. Adding two volatility factors leads to an average R 2 of 22.6%. If we take into account the fact that we work with changes in the dependent variable, this is a very good result. The third factor, whose eigenvalue is very small, increases the R 2 by 3.4%. The second factor significantly improves the quality of the regressions for the UK (and also for Germany), increasing the R 2 by 10%. Its impact for France (and also for Italy) is small, improving the R 2 by 5%, whilst for Spain adding factors beyond the first one does not improve the R 2 at all. However, the R 2 is still significantly higher than what we obtain during the GFC.
For the US market, for this second subsample we can draw the following conclusions. Contrarily to the European market the first volatility factor leads to an R 2 of 4%, which is quite low. Interestingly, the second volatility factor increases the R 2 by 19%, which is a huge improvement. Lastly, the third factor adds 12% to the R 2 , in contrast to the European results. This case also underlines the importance of lowerorder factors despite their small eigenvalue in the spectral decomposition. Furthermore, it has a profound impact on the choice of the number of factors because our results suggest that, if we wanted to work with a consistent model, we would need a three-factor model.
We now analyse the regressions of the volatility factor on the credit factors and start with the European countries.
In this case the situation is rather different. The second and third credit factors do not improve the regressions for any of the countries as the R 2 remain virtually unchanged after the addition of these factors. The first credit factor allows us to obtain a low R 2 of 9% for France, but an average R 2 of 14.5% for the other countries. This is clearly an improvement compared with the earlier subsample. What is also important to note is that Spain and Italy experienced the turmoil of the sovereign debt crisis during that periodand still, the connection between the credit and volatility markets was intact. For the US, the results are similar in the sense that adding factors does not improve the R 2 and, in contrast with the European markets, the first volatility factor leads to an R 2 as low as 4%.
In conclusion, the hedge of the credit factor using volatility factors can be effective and lower-order factors improve the quality of the hedge (as represented by the adjusted R 2 ) significantly. The hedge of the volatility factor using credit factors cannot be improved beyond the first credit factor but the results are reasonably good.
Two important conclusions emerge from these results. The GFC led to a breakdown of the relationship between the credit market and the volatility market, jeopardizing any attempt to perform credit-volatility cross-hedges during that period. However, this relation can be effective during a crisis as the Italian and Spanish markets show during the second subsample covering the sovereign debt crisis.
Credit Spreads and Equity Volatility during Periods of Financial Turmoil
The results also underline the importance of including higher modes although the associated eigenvalues might be small. Improved explanatory power is found in regressions of both the first CDS factor on volatility factors and the first volatility factor on CDS factors, although our results suggest that the CDS market can be hedged more effectively with the volatility market than vice versa. The R 2 increase between twofold and elevenfold when comparing the second to the first subsample. This is interesting insofar as the findings apply to all countries across the board, no matter whether they were severely affected by the European debt crisis (like Spain and Italy) or barely affected (like Germany and the UK). We conclude that depending on the nature of the crisis the CDS-volatility relation can vanish.
Analysis of Intra-Market Linkages
During the GFC there was a breakdown of the relationship between the credit and the volatility markets both in the US and Europe. As this was a global crisis, we wonder to which extent the European credit and volatility markets were connected to the US markets. To quantify this relation we restrict ourselves to the first credit and volatility factors and perform regressions of these factors on the first US credit and volatility factors separately during the GFC.
From a mathematical point of view for the credit factors we perform the regressions ❺ ❻ These allow us to determine if the European credit factors can be hedged using either the US volatility factor (5) or the US credit factor (6). Similarly, for the volatility factors we carry out the regressions
❼ ❽
The results for these regressions are reported in Table 4 .
For the European credit factors regressed on the US volatility factor and for the European volatility factors regressed on the US credit factor we obtain similar results. Namely, the adjusted R 2 is very small (less than 2%), thus implying a poor credit-volatility market linkage. This is not a surprise as we cannot expect these relationships to be stronger than the relationship between the credit market and the volatility market within the same country, which is known to be weak for this subsample (see the previous sections of this paper of the previous subsection the improvement is significant.
The implication is that, during the GFC, the hedge of a European CDS (volatility) position could have been more effective using the US CDS (volatility) market than using the European volatility (CDS) market. The same applies to a US CDS position, which could have been hedged using the European CDS markets. have been suppressed in order to conserve space. The symbol *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Conclusion
In this work we propose a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap spreads and the implied volatility surface. Using the methodology developed in Da Fonseca and Gottschalk (2013), we develop a factor decomposition for both markets which allows us to study them globally, i.e. the entire term structure of CDS spreads and the entire implied volatility surface. We implement our methodology on a database of options and CDS spreads for five European countries and the United States in a sample covering both the Global Financial Crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . The factor decompositions for the implied volatility surface and the CDS curve allow us to handle the joint statistical properties of the two markets.
To quantify how crises affect the relationship between the credit and volatility markets we perform a regression analysis which underlines the cross-hedging opportunities between the two markets. We find that during the European debt crisis the connection between the credit and volatility markets is rather good albeit some of the counstries (Spain and Italy) experienced severe turmoil over this period. During the GFC there is a clear breakdown of the relationship between the two markets for all countries. Robustness checks with US data confirm these results. Consistently with Da Fonseca and
Gottschalk (2013) we find that the relation is not reciprocal, i.e. credit factors can be hedged more effectively using volatility factors than vice versa. Moreover, factors with small eigenvalues can be very important from a cross-hedging point of view; this has far-reaching consequences from a risk management perspective as the number of factors chosen for a model should not depend only on the eigenvalue decomposition.
